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Introduction
As long as men have been able to think, the ideas they develop have
been the subject of conflicting claims of ownership. Professor Melville
Nimmer has traced the efforts to protect writings as the embodiment of
ideas as far back as the First century A.D.1 In the early development of
English statutory copyright law,2 ideas, like all personal thoughts, were
regarded as the property of the author only so long as they remained
exclusively in the author's mind, confined "like birds in a cage."' 3 Thus,
t Mr. Swarth's Note received First Prize in the Third Annual Los Angeles County Bar
Association Entertainment Law Writing Competition of 1989. By agreement with this
association, CoMM/ENT publishes the competition's first prize paper.
* J.D., Loyola Law School, 1989. This Note was written during the author's final year
of law school. Mr. Swarth is currently practicing law in the office of the Los Angeles County
Public Defender. Mr. Swarth gives special thanks to Professor Lon Sobel of Loyola Law
School.
1. Libbot, Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass Communica-
tions World, 14 UCLA L. REV. 735, 737 (1967) (citing 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT § 166, 715 n.5 (1963)).
2. The Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne ch. 19, was the first copyright statute. 1 M. NIM-
MER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.02[A], at 4-8 (1988).
3. Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2354-55, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 229 (K.B. 1769) (Yates, J.,
dissenting).
the developing common law of copyright protected the author's work
only up to the point of publication.
The desire of the author to own the product of his thinking conflicts
with the larger societal need to encourage "progress of the arts and sci-
ences through the building of one idea upon another,"4 which might not
occur in the absence of free circulation of ideas. Courts have long sought
a balance between encouraging creativity of the individual author and
making ideas available to all as the building blocks of progress. Justice
Mansfield observed as follows:
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial;
the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for the
service of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and
the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may




In recognition of the importance of creative thought as the stimulus
of progress, the framers of the Constitution granted Congress the power
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries."6 The first copyright legislation pur-
suant to this constitutional mandate was enacted in 1790,' and the most
recent legislation was adopted in 1976.8
The current copyright statute would seem to be explicit enough to
end the debate about idea protection by providing that "[i]n no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea ... regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illus-
trated, or embodied in such work."9 Yet, despite this unequivocal lan-
guage, cases continue to arise in which litigants argue over the use of and
compensation for ideas, reflecting an ongoing tension between the public
interest in access to new ideas and the perceived injustice of allowing
4. Note, Beyond the Realm of Copyright: Is There Legal Sanctuary for the Merchant of
Ideas?, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 284, 284-85 (1974).
5. Cary v. Longman, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139-40 n.b (1785) (reprinting Sayre v. Moore).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. This law provided "for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps,
charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein
mentioned." 17 U.S.C.A. explanation, at VI (West 1977) (quoting Copyright Act of May 31,
1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124).
8. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 were enacted in 1976 and 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 were added in
1984 to protect semiconductor chip products. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988).
9. Id. § 102(b).
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someone to exploit commercially the ideas of others without
compensation.
The result has been the development of a "law of ideas,"'" a doc-
trine "which attempts to strike a middle ground between the comprehen-
sive protection of copyright on the one hand, and the complete denial of
any legal protection for ideas on the other."' 1 In his original 1954 arti-
cle,12 and in subsequent editions of his renowned treatise on copyright
law, Professor Nimmer described five theories upon which an idea seller
could seek protection from the courts: literary property, quasi-contract,
express contract, implied-in-fact contract, and confidential relationship.' 3
Nimmer also distinguished between literary ideas, such as ideas for mo-
tion pictures, radio programs, and television shows "which upon devel-
opment would become literary property and therefore copyrightable,"
and those ideas "which regardless of development could never be the
subject of copyright," such as ideas for business methods or scientific
devices. 4 Courts, however, have not distinguished the cases along these
lines; instead, they generally apply the same requirements for protection
to literary, 5 business,' 6 and scientific ideas.' 7
There is no doubt, however, that this area of law has special signifi-
cance to the entertainment industries, known for their "voracious appe-
tite[s] for new ideas."'" As a result, most of the significant litigation
concerning the protection of ideas has occurred in the jurisdictions cov-
ering the two great centers of entertainment and media, New York and
California. Yet, instead of developing a uniform set of standards to oc-
cupy the "middle ground," the courts in New York and California have
taken positions diametrically opposed to each other.
Two recent cases highlight just how far apart New York and Cali-
fornia are on this question. New York courts hold that an idea cannot
find protection in the law, even if it is the subject of a contract, unless it is
10. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 16.01 to -.08 (1986).
11. Id. § 16.01
12. Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 119 (1954).
13. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, §§ 16.02 to -.06.
14. Nimmer, supra note 12, at 123.
15. See Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 844 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 391 (1988), Healey v. R.H. Macy & Co., 251 A.D. 440, 297 N.Y.S. 165 (1937),
aff'd, 277 N.Y. 681, 14 N.E.2d 388 (1938).
16. See Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 132 N.Y. 264, 30 N.E. 506 (1892);
Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 201 A.D. 794, 195 N.Y.S. 574 (1922), aff'd, 235 N.Y. 609, 139 N.E.
754 (1923); Educational Sales Programs, Inc. v. Dreyfus Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 412, 317 N.Y.S.2d
840 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
17. See Tele-Count Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 168 Cal. App. 3d 455, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 276 (1985).
18. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 16.01, at 16-3.
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the property of the party seeking the court's protection. 19 Proprietary
interest is demonstrated by the idea's "novelty" 20 and "concreteness." 21
In Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 22 the Second Circuit reiterated
New York's stand that an idea must be "novel" and "concrete" to be
protectable. In California,2 3 an author, whose work qualified for copy-
right protection, lost a copyright infringement claim because his work
was nonfiction.24 Yet, he was granted compensation for the defendant's
use of the noncopyrightable, abstract idea embodied in his completed
work because the court identified a confidential relationship between the
parties and implied a contract regarding the idea.
Despite their apparent differences, the New York and California ap-
proaches to cases involving ideas share something very important: Both
threaten the free flow of ideas necessary to the progress and development
of the arts. The New York scheme offers only illusory protection to the
"idea man," removing any incentive for him to divulge his idea. The
California approach over-protects the idea discloser, thereby threatening
to close off the markets which purchase such ideas, whether they are
presented in the abstract or are embodied in copyrighted works.
The decisions by the Second Circuit in Murray v. National Broad-
casting Co., 25 and by the Ninth Circuit in Landsberg v. Scrabble Cross-
word Game Players, Inc.,26 demonstrate how far the law has strayed
from offering useful protection to idea creators and users. An examina-
tion of these two cases, of the requirements of "novelty" and "concrete-
ness" as applied in New York, and the lack of such requirements in
California, demonstrates the necessity for a new, more uniform approach
to idea protection.
A. Murray v. National Broadcasting Co.
In 1980, Hwesu Murray, then working as a Unit Manager for NBC
Sports, contacted an official of the network's programming department
about his ideas for new programs.27 This was not part of his regular,
19. See Downey v. General Foods Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 56, 286 N.E.2d 257, 334 N.Y.S.2d
874 (1972); Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 132 N.Y. 264, 30 N.E. 506 (1892); Soule
v. Bon Ami Co., 201 A.D. 794, 195 N.Y.S. 574 (1922), aff'd, 235 N.Y. 609, 139 N.E. 754
(1923).
20. Downey, 31 N.Y.2d at 61, 286 N.E.2d at 259, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
21. See Stone v. Marcus Loew Booking Agency, 63 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221-22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1946).
22. 844 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 391 (1988).
23. Landsberg v. Scrabble Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1986).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 49-51.
25. 844 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 391 (1988).
26. 802 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1986).
27. Murray, 844 F.2d at 990.
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salaried duties. The official suggested that he put his ideas in writing and
submit them to the department.2" When Murray submitted his written
proposal, he told the NBC official that he was doing so in confidence and
that if they were used, he expected to be executive producer of the pro-
grams and to be financially compensated for his efforts.29 One of these
ideas was a situation comedy about a black middle class family entitled
Father's Day. 30
After seeing the first submission, the NBC official suggested that
Murray "flesh out" his Father's Day proposal and submit it to a vice-
president in the network programming division. 31 The subsequent ex-
pansion of his idea included the suggestion that the role of the father be
played by Bill Cosby.32 The NBC vice-president subsequently returned
the submission, informing Murray that NBC was not interested in pursu-
ing development of the idea at that time.33
When The Cosby Show debuted on NBC in 1984, Murray recog-
nized his idea and launched a suit against NBC, asserting that NBC had
violated his property rights in his program idea, that NBC was in breach
of an implied-in-fact contract to pay him for the use of the idea, and that
NBC had been unjustly enriched by the use of his idea.34
NBC moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff's
idea was neither "novel" nor "concrete," and that under New York law
the plaintiff would be unable to obtain any recovery for an idea which
lacked those requirements. 35 The district court granted the motion,
agreeing with the defendants that the idea which Murray had submitted
had been in circulation for a long time36 and was merely a new combina-
tion of several ideas which had been used many times before in television
comedies.37 As such, there was insufficient novelty in the plaintiff's idea
with which the court could find a property right for the plaintiff. Citing
the New York Court of Appeals' declaration in Downey v. General Foods







34. Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 671 F. Supp. 236, 238-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
aff'd, 844 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 391 (1988) (plaintiff also alleged
violations of his right to freely contract pursuant to the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981).
35. Id. at 239.
36. Id. at 241 (court noted a newspaper interview Bill Cosby gave in 1965, in which he
outlined a similar idea).
37. Id at 244.
38. 31 N.Y.2d 56, 286 N.E.2d 257, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1972).
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fatal to any cause of action based on the use of that idea." '39 The appel-
late court upheld the decision of the district court.4"
B. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc.
The most recent statement of the law regarding protection of ideas
in California followed a more circuitous route than Murray, resulting in
a decision which found protection for plaintiff's abstract idea, apart from
its copyrightable expression.'
In Landsberg, Mark Landsberg brought suit for copyright infringe-
ment and breach of implied-in-fact contract after the defendants pub-
lished a book very similar to a transcript of his Scrabble strategy game
book, which he had submitted to them.42 Landsberg was the acknowl-
edged champion of the Scrabble Crossword Game in Southern California
when he decided to write a book describing his strategies for winning the
famous board game.43 In order to avoid a possible suit for trademark
infringement by the game's manufacturer, Selchow and Righter Co.,
Landsberg wrote to the company, informing them of his plan and re-
questing the use of the Scrabble trademark in his title." The company
responded with a request to view the manuscript for evaluation.4
Although Selchow and Righter had been planning on publishing
such a book of its own, it had not yet developed anything of substance.46
The company then entered into negotiations with Landsberg for the
rights to his manuscript and had one of its own game experts evaluate
it.47 When the negotiations broke down, Landsberg demanded his manu-
script back. Shortly thereafter, Selchow and Righter published its own
Scrabble strategy book, which was similar to Landsberg's work,
although not an exact copy.
48
In the first trial, the court found that there was sufficient proof of
both access and substantial similarity to find that the defendants had in-
fringed the plaintiff's copyright.49 On appeal, however, the trial court's
39. Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 671 F. Supp 236, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd,
844 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 391 (1988).
40. Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 844 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 391 (1988).
41. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1986).
42. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
43. Id. at 486.
44. Id
45. Id.
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decision was overturned on the basis that the nonfiction character of
Landsberg's work required virtual word-for-word copying in order to be
infringed."0 The court noted that in the case of factual works, "similarity
of expression may have to amount to verbatim reproduction or very close
paraphrasing before a factual work will be deemed infringed."'"
However, because the trial court had not made a finding on plain-
tiff's breach of implied-in-fact contract claim, the case was remanded for
a new trial.52 On remand, the trial court entered a judgment for the
plaintiff on his contract claim, on the basis that the initial disclosure of
the manuscript had been in confidence and that, given plaintiff's ex-
pressed intention of marketing his book for commercial advantage, any
use by defendant was conditioned upon payment.53
Essentially, Landsberg was unable to protect the copyrighted ex-
pression of his idea, but was able to protect the idea itself through an
implied contract. This is the very result which copyright laws are
designed to avoid.54 The irony is that while the court was denying copy-
right protection to Landsberg's book because the particular genre re-
quired that it use a very narrow application of the substantial similarity
test, the contract claim was successful because in California "novelty" is
irrelevant in an action seeking recovery for the use of an idea disclosed
pursuant to a contract.
In comparing Murray and Landsberg, a strong contrast between the
approaches of New York and California courts to the protection of ideas
is revealed. The New York courts will not allow protection for an idea
which is not "novel" and "concrete." The current definition and applica-
tion of these terms effectively removes ideas from the universe of legal
protections. California, on the other hand, has now advanced protection
for abstract ideas to a level almost equal to that offered to the copyright-
able expressions of ideas. Yet, despite these differences, both approaches
threaten to result in a more restricted flow of ideas to the marketplace.
50. Id. at 488.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 491.
53. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193, 1196-97 (9th
Cir. 1986).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). Many courts have repeated the axiom that copyright only
protects the author's expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves. See, e.g., Nichols v. Univer-
sal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930); Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257
(1956); Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal. 2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953); Fendler v. Morosco, 253
N.Y. 281, 171 N.E. 56 (1930).
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Novelty and Concreteness in Idea Cases
"Novelty" and "concreteness" are two terms New York courts have
adopted to measure an idea's protectability. However, because of the
way courts have used them, they are no longer effective measures of pro-
tectibility. Instead, they serve as complete barriers to idea protection.
A. "Concreteness"
Although many cases have declared that an idea is not protectable if
it is not "concrete," few have taken the trouble to express a definition of
the term. While some cases use "concreteness" as a level of conceptual
development, others use it merely to mean a tangible expression of the
idea, similar to that required by copyright law. Even more often, courts
seem to straddle the fence between the two.
In Stone v. Marcus Loew Booking Agency," the court said that "an
idea which never takes concrete form at the time of disclosure, even if
novel, is not the subject of a property right or of contract."56 In Carneval
v. William Morris Agency," the trial court held that the plaintiff could
not successfully prosecute a case for quasi-contractual relief unless he
proved "independent creation of a new, novel, unique idea or a combina-
tion of ideas reduced to concrete form."5" In both of these cases, the
courts seemed to require only a "written expression" of the idea in
question.
In Healey v. R.H. Macy & Co.,59 the plaintiff successfully sued on a
theory of implied contract to recover the value of advertising slogans and
ideas submitted to the defendant. The defendant had used the slogan, "A
Macy Christmas Means a Happy New Year." Yet, in Bailey v. Haberle
Congress Brewing Co., I a case with similar facts, the court denied the
plaintiff's implied contract claim arising from defendant's use of the slo-
gan "Neighborly Haberle" which the plaintiff claimed to have submitted.
The difference between the two cases was that "[iun the Macy case...
plaintiff submitted to defendant not merely a slogan, but a full and com-
plete advertising plan in writing, featuring the slogan, with drawings and
sketches, and 200 words of carefully phrased advertising material."61
55. 63 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946).
56. Id. at 222.
57. 124 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 284 A.D. 1041, 187 N.Y.S.2d 612
(1954).
58. Id. at 320.
59. 251 A.D. 440, 297 N.Y.S. 165 (1937), aff'd, 277 N.Y. 681, 14 N.E.2d 388 (1938).
60. 193 Misc. 723, 85 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Syracuse Mun. Ct. 1948).
61. Id. at 726, 85 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
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The vagueness which plagues the use of "concreteness" is evident in
that it is not clear whether the Bailey court viewed the writing submitted
in Healey as simply a tangible expression of the plaintiff's idea, or as a
fully developed concept. Regardless, the courts' approval of protection
in Healey and denial in Bailey are inconsistent since the only thing used
by either defendant was the slogan.62
If "concreteness" stands for a particular level of development, there
is a problem in identifying what that level is. At what point is an idea
"concrete"? One line of analysis, the "immediate use" theory, holds that
an idea is "concrete" when "it has been developed to the point where it is
ready for immediate use without any embellishment. ' 63 Yet, as Profes-
sor Nimmer has noted, "If we think of an idea as a 'conception, . . . a
preliminary plan,' then surely to speak of an idea developed to the point
where it is ready for use presents a contradiction in terms since if an idea
is so developed it ceases to be merely an idea." 6
A second line of analysis, which relies on the "elaborated idea ' 65
standard, is less concerned with specific levels of development. This ap-
proach seems more appropriate for cases where a plaintiff has divulged
an idea which the defendant has managed to exploit. This theory asks,
"Could the interpreter have produced the finished article, the end prod-
uct, if the author had not produced the elaborated idea?" 66
B. "Novelty"
"Novelty" as a requirement for idea protection appears to have two
distinct, yet related, applications. First, it is a measurement of an idea's
value as consideration for an exchange. As a corollary, the idea must be
the property of the plaintiff in order to be consideration.
In Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 67 the court articulated the argument that
an idea which was not "novel" could not have any value as considera-
tion. The plaintiff had offered to reveal to the defendant company an
idea that would result in increased profits for the company, in return for
a fifty percent share of the increase. 68 His idea was for defendant to raise
the wholesale price of its product in such a way as would not decrease
retail sales. 69 The court refused to enforce plaintiff's claim based upon
an express contract because, although "[t]he plaintiff did tell the defend-
62. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 16.08[A], at 16-55.
63. Id at 16-52.
64. Id. at 16-53.
65. Note, supra note 4, at 290.
66. Id.
67. 201 A.D. 794, 195 N.Y.S. 574 (1922), aff'd, 235 N.Y. 609, 139 N.E. 754 (1923).
68. Id. at 795, 195 N.Y.S. at 575.
69. Id.
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ant a method by which its profits could be increased, . . . it was not
valuable information, in the respect that it was new or novel."'7 There-
fore, "the evidence did not show any consideration for the defendant's
agreement to pay the plaintiff one-half of its increased profits." '71
Many cases have declared that idea protectability is dependent upon
a proprietary interest in the idea on the part of the plaintiff,72 even when
the plaintiff's claim is based on an alleged contract.73 "Novelty" is the
standard applied to prove this property interest. The contention is that if
the idea is not in some way unique to the plaintiff, it is not his property
and, therefore, not valuable consideration. Thus, in Downey v. General
Foods Corp.,"4 the New York Court of Appeals declared that:
An idea may be a property right. But when one submits an idea to
another, no promise to pay for its use may be implied, and no asserted
agreement enforced, if the elements of novelty and originality are ab-
sent, since the property right in an idea is based upon these two
elements.
75
When courts require that an idea must be "novel" in order to find
protection, the meaning is not always clear. The American Heritage Dic-
tionary defines "novel" as, among other things, "strikingly new, .... unu-
sual" or "different."' 76 Often, "novelty" is invoked in conjunction with
the term "original."177 Rather than identifying the creator, however, this
use seems to be an attempt to require an idea to be unique,7 a standard
which is virtually impossible to achieve.79
It would seem sufficient that the idea be required to be "novel" vis-
a-vis the defendant. A plaintiff must offer sufficient proof of an agree-
ment for him before revealing the idea. Then, "even if the idea
originated with persons other than the plaintiff, and had been known
prior to disclosure, if the defendant first learns of the idea by plaintiff's
70. Id. at 796, 195 N.Y.S. at 576.
71. Id. at 797, 195 N.Y.S. at 576.
72. See Downey v. General Foods Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 56, 286 N.E.2d 257, 334 N.Y.S.2d
874 (1972); Ed Graham Prods. v. National Broadcasting Co., 75 Misc. 2d 334, 347 N.Y.S.2d
766 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973); Bailey v. Haberle Congress Brewing Co., 193 Misc. 723, 85
N.Y.S.2d 51 (Syracuse Mun. Ct. 1948).
73. See Stone v. Marcus Loew Booking Agency, 63 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946);
Cole v. Phillips H. Lord, Inc., 262 A.D. 116, 28 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1941).
74. 31 N.Y.2d 56, 286 N.E.2d 257, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1972).
75. Id. at 61, 286 N.E.2d at 259, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
76. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 898 (New
College ed. 1975).
77. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 16.08[B], at 16-58 to -59.
78. Id.
79. This is particularly so in the area of dramatic literature, where it has been said that
there are only thirty-six possible dramatic plots. See Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 741, 299
P.2d 257, 271 (1956) (citing G. POLTI, THE THIRTY-SIx DRAMATIC SITUATIONS (1954)).
HASTINGS COMWiENT L.J. [Vol. 13:117
disclosure," there would be sufficient grounds to hold the defendant to
his promise to pay.80
Some courts have been willing to acknowledge that "novelty" may
be found in a new combination of old ideas.8 ' However, a federal district
court in New York recited that
the fact that a plaintiff's idea "embodies elements long in use does not
of itself negate originality or novelty[.]" ... [I]n order to be protect-
able, adaptations of ideas must[] "show genuine novelty and invention,
and not a merely clever or useful adaptation of existing knowledge[.]
.. [T]he judicious use of existing means or the mixture of known in-
gredients in somewhat different proportions-all the variations on a
basic theme-partake more of the nature of elaboration and renovation
than innovation."
8 2
In Murray, the plaintiff offered evidence of the defendant's own be-
fief that the idea for a situation comedy featuring a black family was
"novel." He pointed to the contract between NBC and Carsey-Werner,
the producers of The Cosby Show, which stated that Carsey-Werner's
failure to perform would "cause NBC irreparable loss of a unique, intel-
lectual property."8 3 In his deposition, NBC President Brandon Tartikoff
described The Cosby Show as "add[ing] a new and unique dimension to
the American television family program genre."8 4 Bill Cosby also testi-
fied that "he would agree with a description of The Cosby Show as
unique, novel and a breakthrough in television programming." s
Yet the court rejected these assertions of "novelty" to find that
"plaintiff's proposal merely combined two ideas which had been circulat-
ing in the industry for a number of years-namely, the family situation
comedy, which was a standard formula, and the casting of black actors in
nonstereotypical roles for which the television industry recognized a
need." 86
The incredibly high threshold for protection required by New York
was long ago renounced by the California courts. In Desny v. Wilders7
80. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 16.08[B] at 16-62 to -63.
81. Baut v. Pethick Constr. Co., 262 F. Supp 350, 361 (M.D. Pa. 1966); see Murray v.
National Broadcasting Co., 671 F. Supp. 236, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd 844 F.2d 988 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 391 (1988); McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F. Supp. 277, 286
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Educational Sales Programs v. Dreyfus Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 412, 416, 317
N.Y.S.2d 840, 844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
82. McGhan, 608 F. Supp. at 286 (citations omitted) (quoting both Baut v. Pethick Con-
str. Co., 262 F. Supp. 350, 361 (M.D. Pa. 1966) and Educational Sales Programs v. Dreyfus
Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 412, 416, 317 N.Y.S.2d 840, 844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), respectively).
83. Murray, 671 F. Supp. at 240.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 241.
87. 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956).
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the California Supreme Court discussed the use of "novelty" as a stan-
dard for protectability, stating as follows:
Certainly it must be recognized that a literary composition does not
depend upon novelty of plot or theme for the status of "property" if it
is entitled to that status at all. The terms "originality" and "novelty"
have often been confused, or used without differentiation, or with
meanings which vary with different authorities. We therefor [sic] sug-
gest the sense in which we use them. A literary composition may be
original, at least in a subjective sense, without being novel. To be origi-
nal it must be a creation or construction of the author, not a mere copy
of another's work. The author, of course, must almost inevitably work
from old materials, from known themes or plots or historical events,
because, except as knowledge unfolds and history takes place, there is
nothing new with which to work. But "creation," in its technical
sense, is not essential to vest one with ownership rights in intellectual
property. Thus, a compiler who merely gathers and arranges, in some
concrete form, materials which are open and accessible to all who have
the mind to work with like diligence is as much the owner of the result
of his labors as if his work were a creation rather than a
construction.88
Under the reasoning expressed in Desny, Murray would not be automati-
cally disqualified from copyright protection simply because elements of
his idea had been used before.
Notwithstanding the fact that the application of "concreteness" is
vague and that "novelty" is too far beyond "originality" to be achieved,
the New York approach mixes incompatible concepts by requiring a
"property" interest in an idea which is to be the subject of a contract.
Dissenting in the California Supreme Court's decision in Stanley v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, 9 Justice Traynor argued succinctly:
The policy that precludes protection of an abstract idea by copyright
does not prevent its protection by contract. Even though an idea is not
property subject to exclusive ownership, its disclosure may be of sub-
stantial benefit to the person to whom it is disclosed. That disclosure
may therefore be consideration for a promise to pay (citations omit-
ted). Unlike a copyright, a contract creates no monopoly; it is effective
only between the contracting parties; it does not withdraw the idea
from general circulation. Any person not a party to the contract is free
to use the idea without restriction.'
Moreover, as the California court noted in Chandler v. Roach,91 the
requirement of a "property" interest in an idea is undesirable because,
"When the action is on a contract theory and this test is invoked the
88. Id. at 741-42, 299 P.2d at 271-72.
89. 35 Cal. 2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950).
90. Id. at 674, 221 P.2d at 85 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
91. 156 Cal. App. 2d 435, 319 P.2d 776 (1957).
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court is using it as part of a process which was specifically developed to
avoid the consequences of the test." 92
The New York approach creates a separate, lower status for idea
vendors, as opposed to purveyors of any other type of product. Only
"idea men" must have their product regularly subjected to examination
regarding its value as consideration. But, as held by California courts,
"Their status should be identically the same as that of any other person
in any other implied-in-fact contract situation. In other words, the
courts should not engraft to the requirements .. . something which
neither party has contemplated and which is not a requirement in any
other form of implied-in-fact contract." 93
"Novelty" is not an implied requirement in a contract for any other
type of service or product. For example, when NBC asks one of its sup-
pliers to show pencils for sale, and uses one of them, it cannot deny the
contract to pay for its use on the ground that a pencil can be gotten
anywhere. However, NBC asked Murray to show his product, and then,
having used it,94 sought to deny responsibility to pay for it on the basis
that this product could be gotten elsewhere.
The inevitable result of the New York approach, which denies even
contractual protection to idea purveyors, forces them to decline to show
their wares to anybody for fear that they will have no recourse when
their ideas are stolen from them. Certainly, this result is not in the inter-
est of promoting progress through the free flow of ideas.
III
Problems in the California Approach to Idea
Protection
The California approach to idea protection, having no requirement
of "novelty" or "concreteness," provides a much more favorable environ-
ment for the "idea man." Instead of judging an idea by its value offered
as consideration, the courts can concentrate on the existence of a con-
tractual relationship, or lack thereof. However, the apparent willingness
to take a liberal view toward the subject of agreements, as in Landsberg v.
Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc.,95 threatens to tip the balance of
the law so much in favor of idea sellers that it endangers the existence of
the markets which buy their products.
92. Id. at 444, 319 P.2d at 782 (quoting Case Notes, 26 S. CAL. L. REv. 459-61 (1952)).
93. Id. at 443, 319 P.2d at 782.
94. Although NBC's use of the plaintiff's idea was never proved, for the purpose of the
defendants' summary judgment motion the court "assumed that defendants used plaintiff's
idea." Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 671 F. Supp. 236, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
95. 802 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1986).
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California courts have taken an expansive approach to finding agree-
ments between plaintiffs and defendants in idea cases. In Desny v. Wil-
der, 96 the court stated that
if a producer is not commercially soliciting, and is not willing to accept
an obligation to pay for valuable ideas, or for compositions adapting
and implementing them, which ideas and compositions are offered to
be conveyed only upon the assumption of such an obligation, he does
not need to read manuscripts which he knows are submitted on those
terms.
97
However, contracts are only found "if the idea purveyor has clearly
conditioned his offer to convey the idea upon an obligation to pay for it if
it is used by the offeree and the offeree, knowing the condition before he
knows the idea, voluntarily accepts its disclosure." 98 On that basis, the
court declined to find a contract in Faris v. Enberg, 99 where the plaintiff
disclosed the idea to the defendant in an attempt to hire Enberg as an
employee in the production of his game show idea, not as part of an effort
to sell the idea to defendant. But when the court believes it fair to impute
knowledge of the plaintiff's purpose to a defendant, a contract will gener-
ally be implied."0
If courts are liberally construing the requirements for implying con-
tracts, the next issue must be to find the subject of the alleged agree-
ments. In Ware v. Columbia Broadcasting System, '0' the court declined
to find a contract for the sale of an idea based upon plaintiff's submission
of a completed script to defendant. In that case, plaintiff sued for plagia-
rism and breach of contract based on the defendant's presentation of a
play on its Twilight Zone which plaintiff claimed was similar to his
own. 102 The plagiarism claim failed for lack of sufficient similarity be-
tween the two completed plays.
10 3
As to the contract claim, the court noted the following:
Plaintiff here attached to his complaint not a mere synopsis but a com-
plete dramatic work. The complaint alleges that he submitted it to
defendant "with the express oral understanding and agreement that in
the event plaintiff's said literary property was thereafter used or tele-
cast by said defendants, or any of them, in whole or in part, defendants
would pay plaintiff the reasonable value of such use or telecast."...
96. 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956).
97. Id. at 743, 299 P.2d at 273.
98. Id. at 739, 299 P.2d at 270.
99. 97 Cal. App. 3d 309, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1979).
100. See Blaustein v. Burton, 9 Cal. App. 3d 161, 182, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319, 333 (1970);
Minniear v. Tors, 266 Cal. App. 2d 495, 502, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287, 293 (1968); Chandler v.
Roach, 156 Cal. App. 2d 435, 440-41, 319 P.2d 776, 780 (1957).
101. 253 Cal. App. 2d 489, 61 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1967).
102. Id. at 490, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
103. Id. at 494, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
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Plaintiff does not allege that the parties contracted with respect to any
idea, synopsis, or format.'°4
Because the defendant was not found to be aware that the plaintiff in-
tended to sell the underlying idea, if not the full script, no contract for its
purchase could be implied.
In other cases where the courts have found a contract for an idea, it
was clear that both parties had considered the idea as the subject of the
submission, not literary property."°5 But the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Landsberg'o6 turned this traditional notion of consensual contract upside
down.
Like the plaintiff in Ware, Landsberg submitted his completed man-
uscript to the defendant.107 The negotiations for sale between the two
parties concerned only the purchase by the defendant of the plaintiff's
completed work, 10 8 not the underlying idea of Scrabble strategy. Yet the
court allowed a contract to be implied, covering only the purchase of the
abstract idea embodied in the completed literary property. "o
The danger in such an approach should be immediately obvious.
Any time a script or other copyrightable piece of work is submitted for
possible sale, the underlying ideas would be included as part of the offer.
In order to avoid litigation, prospective buyers who view material for
purchase must now be careful to avoid both copying the seller's finished
work and creating a new work based upon a similar idea. A court could
find that by viewing the work in question for possible purchase, the buyer
also agreed to purchase the underlying ideas contained in that work.
Buyers, consequently, will decline to view any works for fear that a
seller's work may contain ideas which the buyer may use in another
context.
In this respect, the California courts' rejection of "novelty" and
"concreteness" as measures of the idea itself becomes significant. If
courts are going to hold prospective purchasers liable for the ideas con-
tained in a submitted work, in addition to the work itself, then there
ought to be some method available by which the idea can be associated
with the work in question and with the person making the submission.
Presently, a plaintiff need only allege grounds for finding a contract
and that the idea used by the defendant is similar to the idea in the plain-
104. Id.
105. See Kurlan v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 40 Cal. 2d 799, 256 P.2d 962 (1953);
Blaustein v. Burton, 9 Cal. App. 3d 161, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1970).
106. 802 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1986).
107. Id. at 1195-96.
108. Id at 1196.
109. Id. at 1197.
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tiff's work."' With no requirement that an idea be "novel," a purchaser
may be virtually defenseless when the author whose script is read, but
not purchased, sues because the buyer turned out a product based on a
similar idea to that of the plaintiff. This dispute could result whether or
not the defendant actually used the idea from the plaintiff's work.
Ultimately, however, it will be the writers and other idea purveyors
who will suffer: They will find it increasingly difficult to have their works
examined for possible sale because a reading of their completed scripts
may subject readers to an obligation to pay for any ideas within, even if
the script itself is not used.
IV
Conclusion: A Workable Alternative
Both the California and New York approaches to idea cases
threaten the development of artistic and scientific progress. New York's
standards for approving contracts for ideas are virtually unreachable,
providing a distinct advantage to idea buyers over idea sellers. The "idea
man" runs a genuine risk that any attempts to acquire assistance in the
full development of his idea, by contracting for its divulgence, will result
in the complete loss of any rights to profit from that idea. In California,
the emphasis on implied contract, with no minimum standard as to the
subject of the contract, places potential purchasers at risk of being sued
every time a finished script is read.
There must be a middle ground that can work in both places for the
two parties to idea transactions. The key is to marry the best aspects of
each jurisdiction's approach, while dropping those which are most re-
sponsible for the dangers currently presented.
Essentially, theories of property and proprietary interests in ideas
should be deleted from the law in New York in favor of a broader appli-
cation of contract principles, as in California. At the same time, stan-
dards of "novelty" and "concreteness" should be applied to ideas which
become the subjects of litigation as a means of identifying the idea used
as being the one which was originally bargained for. "Novelty" and
''concreteness" could then be successfully applied to idea cases in much
the same way that the twin measures of access and substantial similarity
apply to copyright cases.
"Novelty," like access, can refer to the availability of the idea in the
world at large. If the idea is one which is very common, such as "a
family situation comedy," then its novelty factor would be considered
110. See, e.g., Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956); Blaustein v. Burton, 9
Cal. App. 3d 161, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1970).
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low. A very unusual idea, such as "a family situation comedy about a
family visited by an extraterrestrial," would be evaluated as more novel.
The goal is to give more favorable treatment to those ideas in which the
plaintiff's original contribution is more apparent.
"Concreteness" should measure the level of development, both
physical and conceptual, which an idea has reached. A writing would
contribute to a finding of more "concreteness" but should not be conclu-
sive. The "elaborated idea" standard examined previously would be the
most suitable measure, because it requires an examination of whether the
finished product embodying the idea could have been produced without
the idea as it was provided by the plaintiff.
These two criteria, "novelty" and "concreteness," could then be ap-
plied in inverse ratio to each other. As the level of "novelty" of an idea
increases, the amount of "concrete" development of the idea necessary to
find for the plaintiff would decrease.
It is important to remember that, although Professor Nimmer urges
that the consideration for a contract on an idea is the act of disclosure, 
1I
the idea itself is really the object of the contract. If the parties were
contracting simply for the service of disclosure, then payment would be
demanded upon completion of that act, not predicated on use of the idea.
The approach recommended here recognizes this. The idea pur-
veyor can feel confident that he may freely and safely contract for the
sale of his product while protecting prospective buyers from spurious
claims of infringement and breach of contract. Both of these concerns
must be addressed if the law of ideas is going to promote progress, not
impede it.
111. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 16.04[A], at 16-19.
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